An earlier version of this writing was used as my senior research thesis at University of Central Florida. What is found here has been cleaned up for a less academic production. To go directly to part two, click here, and for a reference page, please see here.
Evil and Dark Souls: a Contemporary Conception and Modelling of Evil
One topic which has held the attention of Western philosophers since the dawn of humanity is the concept of evil. The topic of evil informs a range of philosophical problems: whether evil exists at all, whether it poses a conceptual contradiction for the existence of God, and how actions can be justified in the face of a conquering evil, among others. J. L. Mackie, writing in 1955, produced the theological problem of evil in perhaps its oldest and most familiar form: “God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false.” (Mackie 200) Though this is not the oldest form of the Problem of Evil, or its only form, it is one of the more common discussions of evil. (The classical “trilemma” formulation for the problem of evil is sometimes referred to as Epicurus’ Trilemma, although no extant work of Epicurus contains such thoughts. The oldest attribution of the trilemma to Epicurus, along with a rebuttal, can be found in Lactantius’ De Ira Dei.) The various interpretations, responses, and defenses of the Problem range from deriving (or dispelling) logical contradictions from the formulation of the Problem, to theodicies (in which one proposes godly justifications for the existence of evil), to existential answers for acknowledging, overcoming, or denying the presence of evil. These various responses alter the formulation of the Problem in some way: they might qualify or categorize evil, or inject the will of humanity into the formulation, or question some aspect of God which is generally considered problematic in relation to evil’s presence. Still others have rejected the Problem outright, either by denying the existence of evil or illustrating that in order to contain a contradiction, additional propositions must be added to the formulation.
In recent literature, responses to the question of evil have served to change the Problem from the traditional theological question. The twentieth century saw a shift in the question of evil from its threat to the existence of an omnibenevolent, omnipresent being, toward an answer to evil. These responses often challenge our ability to perceive evil on an epistemic level, or whether evil truly deserves the right to an existence. Criminologists, psychologists and other social scientists have attempted their own understandings of evil, often through empirical methods which seek to develop the systems of behavior of violent individuals. In other words, the question of evil was no longer only “if evil exists, how can there be a God who is good?” but also, “in the face of a pluralistic, secular world, can we truly define evil?” Such discussions illustrate that evil poses a problem not only for adherents of religion, but also for those with agnostic attitudes toward theological supposition. The various defenses and suppositions of evil can be categorized as a series of duologies: theodicist and antitheodicist (as seen in the work of Kivistö and Pihlström); natural or moral evil (as typified by the theodicy of Leibniz, and Voltaire’s poetic response to it); as existent or constructed; as substance or force. The twentieth century gave rise to several economies of evil – world-engrossing wars, systematic genocide, mass murderers, cults, technological terrorism – and has brought further qualifications to the discussion of evil. Now we discuss evil through its intention (or lack thereof) or through the suffering felt by a party (versus the force in which the evil has been enacted) or through its faceless, bureaucratic enactment which denies the freedom of individual entities. Evil may be quantified into lesser or greater forms, or reduced by turning toward institutional limitations placed upon those who commit such acts.
My aim in this paper is not to address the traditional theological Problem of Evil, but to use its theological origins to propose a conception of evil which synthesizes its various iterations. I argue that much of the literature on evil attempts to make it seem unknowable or incomprehensible, while the comprehension of evil is necessary to understand and overcome it. Furthermore, the various interpretations of the Problem may be reduced, simplified, or synthesized so that it can be made clear that the Problem persists outside the bounds of theology. Many solutions that have been offered are often concerned with the denial of evil, or the reduction of it to the point that evil becomes merely objectified. I argue that evil’s presence, once perceived, becomes one which so-alters any tautological definitions that any rectification of the Problem requires a conception of evil, one that alters the moral/rational dichotomy of evil into one that is borne out of self/other acknowledgement. In other words, the objectification of evil fails to perceive it for what it is – a subject, a thing which enacts. At its core, evil is witnessed or known on the individual level: it is felt not through scientific measures, but through subjective acknowledgement via phenomenological means, first felt through anxiety (rather than the more familiar invocations of simple pain or abject fear). However, it is not enough to say that evil is simply knowledge of an Other with intention to cause suffering through the introduction of anxiety. What constitutes evil, by my account, is the process of “continuous repetition,” where the suffering felt is not merely the result of some intentive destruction, but in some way also an existential obstruction, a forceful disruption of being which both alters the objects of its desire and contains them within a traumatic existence.
Because of the way in which I intend to discuss evil, it may be pertinent to mention (quickly) what I will not be writing about here. Some well-versed readers on the subject of the Problem of Evil may find this paper lacking in the realm of God. This is not by accident, but is a conscious decision to not get distracted from the subject at hand. It would be folly to say that God is not significant to the discussion of evil within the Western tradition; without the God of Abraham there would perhaps be no “problem” of evil. But my point in this writing is to illustrate that the problem persists without God, that there is in fact still a very real “problem” which constitutes evil in the world. Therefore, I will not spend too much time discussing the historical manifestations of God – as whether He is perfect or imperfect, immutable or changing, responsible or not responsible for evil, etc. I will sketch out some of the history of theological supposition on the subject, but I do so only to illustrate the familiar conceptions of evil in the Western tradition. In advance, please forgive me for any undue brevity here, but also do note that because of the nature of my writing, I am explicitly not making any attempt to dispel a particular notion of God, or to give fault to the Abrahamic tradition for its own deliberations. My writing here is intended only to give critique to the long lineage of evil’s conception, and to offer simple rebuttals to depictions of evil itself.I have divided this paper into three sections (ignoring this first bit, the introduction). The first section is devoted to sketching out the common conceptions and arguments held over the subject of evil. There I will focus on the Western tradition, as the Problem of Evil is, at least generally speaking, a Western issue. The second section is devoted to developing a conception of evil which incorporates the theological roots of the Problem into a contemporary, secular understanding of evil. The third and final section of the paper is devoted to modeling this conception of evil within our culture. Part of the philosophical tradition on the Problem is concerned with analyzing historical incidents that give examples of evil acts, as in Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, while others, such as Philippe Nemo in Job and the Excess of Evil, look to cultural symbols (whether they be mythic, religious, or literary) in an attempt to recognize evil at its core. In the final section, I take inspiration from the latter group, treating video games as having capable renderings of evil, in order to analyze a depiction of evil.
(Quick author’s note: Nemo’s depiction of evil differs from familiar conceptions in that it starts as a process of individual anxiety, suffering, and recognition. Following Kierkegaard, Nemo is concerned with the subjective experience of being, but where Kierkegaard was obsessed with “finite/eternal” distinctions, Nemo’s foundations anticipate, but do not really detail, the specific expressions of evil. Nemo’s work has had an astounding amount of influence on mine here in this paper, though where Nemo is concerned with the Other Other, I am concerned here with refuting what could be called the more “scientific” conceptions of evil espoused by such thinkers as Simon Baron-Cohen, Julia Shaw, and Michael Stone.)
Defining the Various Intuitions of Evil
In order to clearly outline a conception of evil, it is necessary first to elaborate on what the various historical intuitions of evil have been. This section is designed not to be a complete history of depictions and conceptions of evil, but as a brief guide to some common historical distinctions on the subject. It would perhaps be impossible for any one work, whether short paper, encyclopedia or book, to catalogue all the world’s depictions of evil. Nevertheless, the various distinctions and qualifications about evil contained here are persistent (in that adherents to these intuitions may be found as of this writing), and so are important for consideration if we are to draw out a conception of evil.
Perhaps the most common way to discern evil in the world is to see it as a balancing force to goodness. The list is near-endless of monstrous sources of evil, including demons, vampires, giants, and leviathans, all which worked against the forces of good. The notion that the scales of morality are balanced by two opposing forces is as old as humanity, found throughout nearly all cultures of the world. One famous source for evil as counterpart to good comes from the book of Genesis:
“But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die. And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die: For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” (Gen 3:3-5)
Whether the story of the Garden of Eden is taken literally or figuratively, its meaning for the Judeo-Christian tradition is the source for human comprehension of morality. The fruit gave knowledge to humanity of both good and evil, which clearly means that the forces are connected in a strict, symmetrical way. In fact, for the Judeo-Christian practitioner, while religious expressions are largely about the recognition of God’s truth, adherence to theistic principles require recognizing the difference between good and evil, and acting in accordance to ways which are deemed good. What’s important about this type of evil in its historical context is that it is seen as having substance, of being an entity (or multiple entities) which populate(s) the world. These often manifest in familiar terms, such as through demons, monsters, and other foul spirits. In more horrifying terms, this is illustrated through xenophobia, racism and sexism. Furthermore, it would be wrong to say that this form of evil is archaic. To be sure, much of the Judeo-Christian population historically believed in supernatural entities which would have been essentially evil, as in literal forces of evil, but recent polls (such as those conducted by the Huffington Post and Gallup) reveal that the belief in such evil entities, while lower, is still a formidable majority. (For a history of the belief in the supernatural, see K. Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic. Thomas points out that belief in supernatural evil forces was mostly literal, and symbolic belief in such forces was not popularized until the end of the sixteenth century.)
Evil as substance is, then, still a popular notion for many, but one alternate theory that developed alongside it is that evil could be seen as the privation of good. The “privation of good” conception of evil is usually attributed to St. Augustine, found primarily in the works Enchiridion and Confessions. The problem that Augustine faced in the “evil as substance” conception was that it implicated God in the creation of evil. If God should have been the source of all things, then God should be responsible for the presence of any creation whose essence could be defined as evil. “When I wanted to think of my God, I knew of no way of doing so except as a physical mass. Nor did I think anything existed which is not material. That was the principal and almost sole cause of my inevitable error.” (Augustine 85) Upon studying the work of Plato, Augustine began to understand the distinction between forms and expressions, and this altered his perception of what evil could be. For Augustine, the entirety of the world was created by God, and God could only will goodness. Therefore, everything in the world was made of this good, and what we name when we recognize evil is the privation of such goodness within a thing. It is not as though God is lacking or powerless, vacant or blind, to a manifestation of evil, but that the expression of an evil is lacking in the goodness that is a part of the subject’s essence. In other words, there is no substantive essence of evil present to create the Problem of Evil; rather, whatever evil one might perceive, is only an entity whose expression is out of line with its essence. Though there was at the time dissent against Augustinian theodicy, its popularity remained, and continues to this day to be a favored depiction of evil. As we shall see, this is one of the first instances of a “free will defense” for evil, intended to solve the classic Problem of Evil.
Modernity’s suppositions on evil, and the ramifications its presence has for the world, focused on one aspect of defining evil. It could be stated that evil is composed of two kinds: moral evil, where evil is willed in some manner by agents or entities; and natural evil, composed by forces of the natural world. Evil of the first sort is usually viewed as the type of evil performed by humans. The latter group of evil is often depicted through natural disasters: through hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, or the myriad diseases and cancers which curse the human body. One famous instance of natural evil is the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755. The earthquake tragically killed several thousand people, and destroyed nearly all of the city. “The Lisbon Earthquake,” a poem by François Arouet de Voltaire, provided a voice for the anguish felt those who saw the event for the evil that it was. “Are you then sure, the power which could create/The universe and fix the laws of fate,/Could not have found for man a proper place,/But earthquakes must destroy the human race? (Voltaire 561)
This distinction between the two types of evil is often useful for theological supposition. Natural evil has sometimes been invoked in order to question God’s benevolence. Moral evil is seen as necessary only in that it accompanies the free will of humanity. Natural evil, on the other hand, seems directly tied to the fabric of reality, independent of the choices that humanity would make. Natural evil’s presence is a source of concern for the “free will defense,” including the dissent posed against Augustinian theodicy. In a free will defense for the Epicurean/trilemma Problem, moral evil is not seen as posing an issue for a God conceived as benevolent, because the responsibility for these evils is attributed to humanity, and not some divine power. Such defenses usually further propose that a world which contains culpable, moral agents is better than a world without such parameters. God, then, retains His (or Its) three necessary elements, and would only choose to make the better of the worlds. This is often summed up by the popular phrase “the best of all possible worlds,” as envisioned by G. W. Leibniz in his Theodicy. In his Monadology, however, Leibniz restates the principle in a way which directly addressed the Epicurean trilemma: “And this is the cause of the existence of the best, which wisdom makes known to God, which his goodness makes him choose, and which his power makes him produce.” (Leibniz 76)
Until the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, much of the critical discussion of evil was still focused on its theological ramifications. Nietzsche wrote two books which systematized evil (Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals). They are some of the earliest whose concerns could be said to be antitheodicist by nature. The work of Kivistö and Pihlström illustrates how historical approaches to conceptualizing evil fall into either a theodicist or antitheodicist account. (Kivistö and Pihlström 2017) Theodicist accounts of evil “refer to all those attempts to deal with the problem of evil and suffering that regard theodicy as a desideratum of an acceptable theistic position, irrespective of whether they end up defending theism or rejecting it.” (Kivistö and Pihlström 2017) Antitheodicism, rather, claims that theodicies fail because their justifications, whether theist or otherwise, do not account for suffering, nor do they address the pointlessness which suffering often occurs through.
Nietzsche’s accounts of good and evil outline the historical uses such concepts have had. To Nietzsche, these distinctions were a self-induced limitation on humanity that kept humans from flourishing. “Just because our moral philosophers knew the facts of morality only very approximately in arbitrary extracts or in accidental epitomes…they never laid eyes on the real problems of morality; for these emerge only when we compare many moralities. In all ‘science of morals’ so far one thing was lacking, strange as it may sound: the problem of morality itself; what was lacking was any suspicion that there was something problematic here.” (Nietzsche 1966, p. 97-98) Instead, he argued that class struggles over time, due to “ressentiment” of the privileged by average citizenry (and, conversely, in what was glorified by the empowered), informed the moral distinctions of good, bad, and evil. (Nietzsche 1989)Nietzsche’s theory of culturally-based evil was not necessarily novel. Many philosophers throughout history, including Baruch Spinoza and David Hume, have questioned the possibility of an innate morality, and many whose work touched upon theology pointed toward God’s morality as being drawn from man – and not vice versa. (For such an investigation, see Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity.) However, Nietzsche’s work has reached a popularity seldom achieved by other philosophers. Whether it was truly due to his work, or due to the rise of relativistic principles, the philosophical literature on evil changed greatly. It seemed, for at least a few decades, that philosophy sought to move past archaic traditions of good and evil. However, after the Holocaust, the question of evil returned in a new light. How can one explain evil, rectify it against the known world, when it has been institutionalized by an entire country? How can one hold judgment for individuals who find themselves in a situation where their agency seems reduced? Hannah Arendt coined the term “banality of evil” in her coverage of the trials for Nazis after World War II to illustrate such a problem. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt shows how our traditional views of evil – as an entity with intention, terrifying to behold – are in fact blown away by the utter dullness of some manifestations. By Arendt’s telling, Eichmann becomes dim, a follower, a person whose supposed ethics wither upon any critical analysis. (Arendt 1964) What is important to take away from such discussion is that the prejudices one might have about evil – that it is menacing, or intentive, or willed, etc. – can be proven false by evil’s mundanity. While we may want to say that there is intention behind the manifestation of evil, often its perpetrators have no conscious justification for what has occurred. In this way, the line between natural and moral evil seems to blur: it seems that the evil actions taken by moral agents are just as often as not made without real choice, or rather, that they occur in some natural manner, “natural” here meaning that they would be the next logical or causal action to be taken.
What, then, is Evil?
Given the diversity of evil throughout history, it might be tempting to say that it does not actually exist outside of being an ethical, human tool. For many, an answer to the variety of conceptions relegates evil to such relativistic terms. Evil in this way becomes merely cultural, a type of “Spy vs. Spy” system of power struggle, where anything which antagonizes a given culture might be villainized to the point of being labeled “evil.” This is not an entirely misguided view, for it seems that the sheer volume of conceptions of evil, and alterations to it over time, would make for defining it onerous. Furthermore, the critical technique that stems from the comprehension of evil often influences the cultural exploration of our histories. Heroes once revered become sinister forces, and cultural norms which only a few short decades ago seemed cherished are suddenly deemed imperialistic, or ignorant hostility. One only needs to look at the case of Christopher Columbus to see how the heroes of yesteryear might become figures which represent the abhorrent actions of our ancestry, a transition which has led many American communities to abandon Columbus Day.
One other issue with developing a conception of evil is the question of whether or not we can truly comprehend what evil is. The needless killing of a serial killer, and the justification one would take to condone an act such as the Holocaust, seem to be so shocking, so foreign, that one might wonder whether or not we could actually come to understand what it is that produces evil. Modern literature on evil seems reflect this. Social scientists, political pundits, psychologists, and many other experts in a wide variety of fields still write on evil, of course, but often their work illustrates an unwillingness to define evil in terms that could be universalized. Psychologist Julia Shaw’s recent book Evil exemplifies the relativistic conception of evil that is so common. “You can call sadistic torture, or genocide, or rape, evil. You may mean something very specific, and have well-reasoned arguments as to why you have called a particular person or act evil. But as soon as you have a discussion about it with others, you may find that what you think is an undeniable act of evil is not perceived that way by them.” (Shaw, p.260) Shaw is not alone in her summation. Other popular social scientists who have gained popularity in recent years have a way of defining evil acts, yet they stop short of universalizing such manifestations. (See the work of Dr. Simon Baron-Cohen, particularly The Science of Evil, and Michael H. Stone, who has penned The Anatomy of Evil as well as The New Evil.) Even when their work does contain an instance of flatly defining an evil act, they treat such instances as unknowable, as beyond comprehension. But while such authors have managed to popularize a model of incomprehensible-evil, there are still some philosophers who believe knowing evil is possible.
Philosopher Paul Formosa has developed a way in which we can understand acts of evil in the moral sense. Formosa wrote that there are three kinds of conceptions of [moral] evil: “victim approaches, which focus on the amount of harm done to victims; perpetrator approaches, which focus on some combination of the cause (e.g. motive), affect and response (e.g. remorse, joy) of the perpetrator; and combination approaches, which incorporate both victim and perpetrator approaches.” (Formosa 2007) Regardless of which of the approaches one uses to conceptualize evil, Formosa points out that we can still come to understand acts of evil despite what might appear to be strange: “…we either give an explanation in terms of a reason we had for acting, or give an explanation of why we acted without really needing any particular reason, namely, because we were in a certain state, or we were forced into acting in a certain way, or because we acted from emotional rather than deliberative grounds…The point I wish to make here is simply that we understand human behavior by seeing what moved the agent to act as they did, and what moved them is often a reason…that spoke in favour of doing that act.” (Formosa 2007) Drawing on the work of psychologists Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Formosa says that we have two methods we can use to come understand actions: “One the one hand, there is the view that we arrive at our understanding of others through theory…and on the other hand, that we do so through simulation…” (Formosa 2007) We don’t however, use one or the other in our search for understanding, but rather we use them as complementary tools, including hybrid applications of the two.
While Formosa’s argument for understanding evil is focused on moral acts, I believe that once we have developed a simple conception of evil, it will be made clear that comprehension can be just as attainable even when the evil in question is not sourced in moral activity. Let us now turn to what it is we mean when we talk about evil.
One often overlooked element of evil is that it occurs through process. Whether evil is felt by the individual, seen in the path of a hurricane, or witnessed through law, when we begin to describe the evil we see, we describe what it is that happens. Even in instances where one would want to describe an entity as being evil, what is produced as witness to the evilness of that entity is a list of evil things which that entity produces. Omar Mateen was evil, sure – because he committed the mass shooting which took place at Pulse Orlando in Florida. Even if we want to chase Mateen’s evilness toward the ideology which produced his actions – “Radical Islam” – we recognize that ideology’s evilness due to the behaviors (the processes) it produces. What is meant by “evil,” then, is not an essence or substance of a thing, but a process. By “process” I mean a chronological series of events, a systematic rupture or change in the state of things.
If evil is a process, then what does such a process look like? The process of evil seems to be one where the functionality of a system of individual substance is inhibited by some force. “Force,” here, is the process which is experienced, be it external or internal, moral or natural, etc. By “functionality,” I mean simply the operation of the system in a way which could be said to be normal for that particular substance. “Individual substance” means that this dog can be expected to “dog,” that a river will run, or that the person known commonly to be the famous actor Tom Hanks will continue to freely be Tom Hanks. To be “inhibited,” however, requires further clarification. One might initially want to say that harm would be fitting enough to make for evil. However, harm for many implies a physicalness, where evil has the ability to perform actions that are intangible. Inhibit does not necessarily imply something that is physical; in fact, it often relates to environmental or societal pressures.
Evil is the process by which the functionality of a system of individual substance is inhibited by some force. The benefits of such a conception of evil are that it resolves some of the historical distinctions which have been drawn about the subject. It is already clear that evil as process does not necessitate substance, which means that privation of good theories of evil are by no means archaic; you can describe what it is you see in an evil process, and still say that what occurs is lacking in the inherent goodness of the objects which the evil afflicts. Perhaps the most important aspect of this conception of evil is that it does not need to address the moral and natural distinctions of evil. We can, of course, look to agency as a source of evil – that through the chosen will of some entity we can see the evil that is produced. However, agency is not necessary for a conception of evil as process, as what is viewed is not always the how of what was chosen, but the process which has been induced. Thus, the existence of evil, whether moral or natural, produces the same outcomes, the same sense of suffering, harm, anxiety or inhibitions.
Now, with our conception of evil developed, let us see how one might find the evil contained within an example of art: the modern video game. Click Here to continue to the next section: “Modelling Evil in the Soulsborne Universe.”